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SOME REFLECTIONS ON LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT RAMIFICATIONS OF
DIOCESAN BANKRUPTCY FILINGS
DAVID L. GREGORYt

INTRODUCTION

It is impossible to overstate the damage done by sexual
predators. Most pernicious are sex crimes committed by clergy
upon children.1 In the Roman Catholic Church in the United
3
States, thousands 2 of crimes perpetrated over several decades
t David L. Gregory is the Dorothy Day Professor of Law, St. John's University
School of Law, Queens, New York, gregoryd@stjohns.edu. B.A., 1973, The Catholic
University of America; M.B.A., 1977, Wayne State University; J.D., 1980, University
of Detroit; LL.M., 1982, and J.S.D., 1987, Yale University. Edward McNamara, A.B.,
2004, Harvard University, J.D. Candidate, June 2009, St. John's University School
of Law, performed extraordinary, superb research in the preparation of this Article.
St. John's provided a summer research grant. I thank President Rita Schwartz and
the officers of the National Association of Catholic School Teachers for their many
discerning comments upon my presentation of this paper as the basis for my keynote
address to the NACST Annual Convention, Boston, October 6, 2007. The paper was
also presented at the Fifteenth Annual Society of Catholic Social Scientists Meeting,
St. John's University School of Law, Queens, New York, October 27, 2007 and, at the
Pontifical University of the Holy Cross, Rome, March 5, 2008. I especially thank my
faculty colleague, Adjunct Professor Mitchell Rubinstein, Senior Counsel, New York
State United Teachers Office of General Counsel, for astute comments on a prior
draft.
1 Of course, other agents of the Catholic Church, including compensated and
volunteer laypersons, have also committed sex crimes. See Bruce Lambert, Case
Highlights Sex Abuse at Church, Beyond Priests, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2007, at B4
(discussing a suit involving a youth minister volunteer who abused minors, resulting
in a jury verdict of more than $11 million); David Staba, Despite New Church Rules,
Sex Abuse in Catholic School Went Unreported, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2007, at B3
(discussing crimes by a part-time computer teacher in a Catholic middle school).
2 See Lambert, supra note 1. The multi-year study by the John Jay College of
Criminal Justice of the City University of New York surveyed every diocese in the
nation, and found that 10,667 people had brought complaints against 4,392 priests
and deacons from 1950 to 2002. Id. The study did not examine or report the number
of such complaints brought against any other agents, ranging from nuns through
ushers, choir members, youth ministers, readers ("lectors") at liturgies, and lay
Eucharistic ministers, for example. See id. Of course, there is no evidence that
Catholic priests have a higher incidence than any other persons, say, teachers, of
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The burgeoning

commentary on the many dimensions of the crisis will certainly
continue to proliferate. 5 Tragically, despite recently instituted
sexual abuse of children. See id. For example:
Charol Shakeshaft, a Hofstra University professor who in 2004 issued a
report analyzing numerous studies of abuse in public schools for the federal
Department of Education, said there was no data showing whether sexual
abuse was more prevalent in the Catholic Church than in other areas of
society. "We just don't know," Professor Shakeshaft said.
Id.; see also Data Shed Light on Child Sexual Abuse by Protestant Clergy, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2007, at All (stating that three insurance companies for a majority
of Protestant churches receive over 260 annual reports of sexual abuse allegations of
children by Protestant clergy); Lisa W. Foderaro, Between Teacher and Student: The
SuspicionsAre Growing, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2007, at Bi (noting a marked increase
in the number of public school teachers in New York charged with sexual
impropriety in recent years); Jon Hurdle, School Crossing Guard Is Charged with
1,000 Counts of Child Molesting, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2007, at A14 (describing
numerous allegations of child sexual abuse against a local crossing guard).
3 See Michael Rubino, Long Dead, a Revered Small-Town Priest Is Disgraced,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007, at A20. A priest and founding pastor serving Jasper,
Indiana for his entire fifty year career, dying in 1986, apparently abused more
children than any other priest predator in the history of the seventy-parish Diocese
of Evansville. See id. The priest never had a complaint against him, civil or criminal,
and, thus far, no law suit has been filed. See id. Bishop Gettelfinger is "sure the
abuse occurred," eleven years after the Bishop first learned of the priest, dead eight
years at the time. Id.
4 The Boston Globe ran a month-long series of investigative articles in 2002,
won the Pulitzer Prize, and spurred a wave of lawsuits. See generally INVESTIGATIVE
STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, BETRAYAL: THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

(2002) (chronicling the sexual abuse of children by priests in the Catholic Church).
The Archdiocese of Boston eventually settled claims of 552 victims for $85 million.
Laurie Goodstein, Deal Reported in Abuse Cases in Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
2007, at Al.
5 No law review article thus far has focused primarily on the labor and
employment consequences of these tactical bankruptcy filings. There are many
aspects of sex crimes against minors that are beyond the scope of this Article. There
is an understandable proliferation of law review articles on the myriad of aspects of
the clergy sex crimes and their consequences. Some of the leading articles are John
A. Alesandro, A Study of Canon Law: Dismissal from the Clerical State in Cases of
Sexual Misconduct, 36 CATH. LAW. 201 (1996); Michael F. Aylward, Constitution,
Crime, Clergy: First Amendment Implications of Sexual Abuse Claims, 70 DEF.
COUNS. J. 196 (2003); Stephen M. Bainbridge & Aaron H. Cole, The Bishop's Alter
Ego: Enterprise Liability and the Catholic Priest Sex Abuse Scandal, 46 J. CATH.
LEGAL STUD. 65 (2007); John S. Baker, Jr., Prosecuting Dioceses and Bishops, 44
B.C. L. REV. 1061 (2003); Kelly W.G. Clark, Kristian Spencer Roggendorf & Peter B.
Janci, Of Compelling Interest: The Intersection of Religious Freedom and Civil
Liability in the PortlandPriest Sex Abuse Cases, 85 OR. L. REV. 481 (2006); John J.
Coughlin, The Clergy Sexual Abuse Crisis and the Spirit of Canon Law, 44 B.C. L.
REV. 977 (2003); Thomas P. Doyle & Stephen C. Rubino, Catholic Clergy Sexual
Abuse Meets the Civil Law, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 549 (2004); Constance Frisby Fain
& Herbert Fain, Sexual Abuse and the Church, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 209 (2006);
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Jo Renee Formicola, The Further Legal Consequences of Catholic Clerical Sexual
Abuse, 49 J. CHURCH & ST. 445 (2007); Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious
Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219 (2000);
Jonathan C. Lipson, When Churches Fail: The Diocesan Debtor Dilemmas, 79 S. CAL.
L. REV. 363 (2006); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and
EcclesiasticalImmunity, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1789 (2004); Adam E. Lyons, Here Is the
Church, Now Who Owns the Steeple? A Revised Approach to Church Property
Disputes, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 963 (2007); Timothy D. Lytton, Clergy Sexual
Abuse Litigation: The Policymaking Role of Tort Law, 39 CONN. L. REV. 809 (2007);
Raymond C. O'Brien, Clergy, Sex and the American Way, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 363
(2004); James T. O'Reilly & Joann M. Strasser, Clergy Sexual Misconduct:
Confronting the Difficult Constitutional and Institutional Liability Issues, 7 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 31 (1994); Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Keeping the Faith: The Rights
of Parishionersin Church Reorganizations,82 WASH. L. REV. 75 (2007); Roundtable
Discussion, Religious OrganizationsFiling for Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 25 (2005); Patrick J. Schiltz, The Impact of Clergy Sexual Misconduct Litigation
on Religious Liberty, 44 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2003); James A. Serritella, Insurance
Coverage Issues in Cases of Clergy Misconduct, 39 CATH. LAW. 55 (1999); Jesse
Belcher-Timme, Note, Unholy Acts: The Clergy Sex Scandal in Massachusetts and
the Legislative Response, 30 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 243 (2004);
Jesse J. Cooke, Comment and Note, Beyond an Unfortunate "Occurrence".Insurance
Coverage and the Equitable Redress of Victims of Sexual PredatorPriests, 36 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1039 (2005); Ryan J. Donohue, Comment, Thou Shalt Not Reorganize:
Sacraments for Sale, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 293 (2005); Timothy Liam Epstein,
Note, Surviving Exemption: Should the Church Exemption to ERISA Still Be in
Effect?, 11 ELDER L.J. 395 (2003); Diana L. Grimes, Note, Practice What You Preach:
How Restorative Justice Could Solve the JudicialProblems in Clergy Sexual Abuse
Cases, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1693 (2006); Ashling A. Lyons, Note, Thou Shalt Not
Make This Plaintiff Whole: First Amendment Implications and Possible Solutions to
the New Jersey Supreme Court's McKelvey Decision in the Wake of the Sexual Abuse
Scandal, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1217 (2004); Daniel J. Marcinak, Comment, Separation of
Church and Estate: On Excluding Parish Assets from the Bankruptcy Estate of a
Diocese Organized as a CorporationSole, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 583 (2005); Felicia
Anne Nadborny, Note, "Leap of Faith" into Bankruptcy: An Examination of the
Issues Surroundingthe Valuation of a Catholic Diocese's Bankruptcy Estate, 13 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 839 (2005); Joel C. Norwood, Commentary Introduction: Clergy
Sexual Abuse, 39 CONN. L. REV. 807 (2007); Janna Satz Nugent, Note, A Higher
Authority: The Viability of Third Party Tort Actions Against a Religious Institution
Grounded on Sexual Misconduct by a Member of the Clergy, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
957 (2003); Kathleen R. Robertson, Note, Dark Days for the Church: Canon Law and
the Response of the Roman Catholic Church to the Sex Abuse Scandals, 4 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 161 (2005); Joseph A. Rohner IV, Comment, Catholic Diocese
Sexual Abuse Suits, Bankruptcy, and Property of the Bankruptcy Estate: Is the "Pot
of Gold" Really Empty?, 84 OR. L. REV. 1181 (2006); Laura Russell, Note, Pursuing
Criminal Liability for the Church and Its Decision Makers for Their Role in Priest
Sexual Abuse, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 885 (2003); Michael J. Sartor, Note, Respondeat
Superior, Intentional Torts, and Clergy Sexual Misconduct: The Implications of
Fearing v. Bucher, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 687 (2004); Emily C. Short, Comment,
Torts: Praying for the Parish or Preying on the Parish? Clergy Sexual Misconduct
and the Tort of Clergy Malpractice, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 183 (2004); Allison Walsh
Smith, Comment, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: A New Battleground in the Ongoing
Conflict Between Catholic Dioceses and Sex-Abuse Claimants, 84 N.C. L. REV. 282
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comprehensive prevention efforts, 6 these crimes continue to
occur.
The Archdiocese of Los Angeles avoided otherwise
probable bankruptcy by achieving a settlement of the claims of
508 victims for $660 million dollars in mid-July of 2007, two days
before the start of the trials wherein Cardinal Mahony would
have been required to testify. 7 This is the largest class
settlement of the Catholic clergy sexual abuse claims to dateincluding prior settlements of eighty-six claims for $114 million,
the Archdiocese of Los Angeles will pay $774 million.8 The
extraordinary risks of going to civil trial on the tort claims
brought by the victims of the crimes are thoroughly untenable. 9
(2005); Beth Wilbourn, Note, Suffer the Children: Catholic Church Liability for the
Sexual Abuse Acts of Priests, 15 REV. LITIG. 251 (1996).
6 Perhaps the best of the analyses offered thus far is Before Dallas: The U.S.
Bishops' Response to Clergy Sexual Abuse of Children (2008), authored by Professor
Nicholas Cafardi, the former Dean of the Duquesne Law School, who has a doctorate
in canon law and was an original member of the National Review Board established
by the Bishops in June 2002. Upon the completion of a multi-year study by John Jay

College of the City of New York, the Bishops of the United States promulgated the
Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People, a comprehensive document
adopted by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. See generally UNITED
STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Charter for the Protection of Children
and Young People (2005). Among its salient features is a requirement that sexual
abuse allegations that come to the attention of Church authorities will be reported to
secular governmental authorities. Id. art. 4. Individual dioceses have instituted
thorough background and record checks. See Lambert, supra note 1 ("[In the past
several years, the church started prevention programs across the country. On Long
Island, the Rockville Centre Diocese says that it has conducted background checks
on 64,000 employees and volunteers.").
7 Laurie Goodstein, Deal Reported in Abuse Cases in Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 2007, at Al [hereinafter Goodstein, Deal Reported].
8 See Laurie Goodstein, After Abuse Settlement, an Apology to Victims, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 2007, at A9 [hereinafter Goodstein, After Abuse Settlement]; Laurie
Goodstein, Payout Is Bittersweet for Victims of Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2007, at
A15.
9 In addition to legitimate, compelling claims, there is likely to be some
percentage of specious, extortionate claims-an especially pernicious, evil
ramification. Priests understandably fear being falsely accused, and some believe
that they are, de facto, presumed guilty and utterly abandoned by their Bishops.
Concomitantly, some plaintiffs' attorneys are working vigorously in lobbying
state legislatures to remove all statutes of limitations from clergy sexual abuse
cases. See Terry Carter, Collaring the Clergy, 93 A.B.A. J., June 2007, at 38, 41
(2007). In 2003, California removed its statute of limitations for filing such civil
claims for one year. Id. at 40. Thus, hundreds of time-barred claims were given a
one-year window of opportunity to proceed. See id. A prominent proponent for
removing the statute of limitations vis-A-vis law suits against the Catholic Church in
the sexual abuse cases is Professor Marci A. Hamilton, author of God vs. the Gavel:
Religion and the Rule of Law (2005) and of the forthcoming book, Justice Denied:
What America Must Do to ProtectIts Children (2008). For a review of the former, see
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Thus far, the Catholic Church has paid more than $1.5
billion in settlements. 10 The total direct costs to the Church may
approach $3 billion. 1 ' These liabilities, even if substantially
covered by insurance, 12 must inexorably take a toll--direct and
indirect-upon the many positive services that the Church could
otherwise initiate. The Archdiocese of Los Angeles announced
that the headquarters of the Archdiocese and dozens of other
properties-but no schools or churches-will have to be sold to
raise funds necessary to effectuate the $774 million settlement.13
This Article will take a somewhat different approach to the
complex, 14 multi-faceted, multi-generational consequences of the
Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1169 (2007) (book review).
The state legislatures of Colorado in 2006 and Delaware in 2007 attempted
unsuccessfully to remove the statute of limitations for sexual abuse committed by
persons working for private (e.g., the Catholic Church) institutions, while retaining
the statute of limitations vis-a-vis public institutions (e.g., public school teachers).
These patently discriminatory anti-Catholic measures, targeting the Catholic
Church while exempting public schools and the entire public sphere, failed to pass
muster. The Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights vigorously opposed the
bifurcation of the removal of the statute of limitations vis-a-vis the private Catholic
Church while retaining it for allegations against public school teachers. In full
disclosure, the author of this Article, Professor Gregory, is the General Counsel pro
bono for the Catholic League.
10 See Goodstein, Deal Reported, supra note 7. The leading settlement is that by
the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, with $774 million paid to settle the claims of almost
600 persons. See Goodstein, After Abuse Settlement, supra note 8. In addition, "[i]n
California, the Diocese of Orange paid $100 million for 90 abuse claims in 2004 and
the Diocese of Oakland paid $56 million to 56 people in 2005. The Diocese of
Covington, in Kentucky, paid about $85 million to about 350 people." Goodstein,
Deal Reported, supra note 7. Although beyond the scope of this Article, the Catholic
Church in the United States has also been afflicted by pervasive embezzlement. A
study by Villanova University concluded in 2006 that embezzlement from Sunday
collections occur in approximately eighty-five percent of all parishes. Laurie
Goodstein, Survey Finds Embezzlement in Many Catholic Dioceses, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
5, 2007, at All; see, e.g., Christopher Maag, Cleveland Diocese Accused of
Impropriety as Embezzlement Trial Nears, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2007, at A8
(discussing a former assistant treasurer of the Diocese of Cleveland charged with
money laundering and tax evasion and noting that a class action suit, which was
ultimately dismissed, was filed against the Bishop "for allowing his top deputies to
embezzle $2 million from the church").
11 Bainbridge & Cole, supra note 5.
12 For example, $227 million of the $660 million settlement in July 2007 of 508
claimants' suits for sexual abuse involving the Archdiocese of Los Angeles will be
paid by the insurers of the Archdiocese. Goodstein, After Abuse Settlement, supra
note 8.
13 Suzanne Sataline, Diocese to Sell Propertiesfor Sex-Abuse Settlement, WALL
ST. J., July 16, 2007, at A6.
14 Goodstein, Deal Reported, supra note 7 ("The Los Angeles cases have been
particularly complex because they involve so many victims, multiple insurance
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Church's sexual abuse crisis. I will examine, and reflect upon,
some of the salient labor and employment ramifications of, thus
far, five, diocesan bankruptcy filings. Five dioceses have filed for
bankruptcy since 2004, and as of December 3, 2007-with the
emergence of the Diocese of Davenport, Iowa from bankruptcy
following a $37 million settlement of the claims of 156 personsall five of the dioceses that filed have emerged from bankruptcy. 15
First, a synoptic chronology and brief overview of the five filings
is necessary.
I.

A.

THE FIVE DIOCESAN BANKRUPTCY FILINGS: 2004-PRESENT

The Archdiocese of Portland

The Archdiocese of Portland, Oregon was the first Catholic
diocese or archdiocese to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the
United States, on July 6, 2004.16 The Portland Archdiocese, with
approximately 356,000 parishioners, filed after paying $53
million to settle 133 claims brought by individuals abused by
diocesan priests, including $21 million in 2004 alone. 17 The filing
halted a pair of sex abuse trials, in which two plaintiffs were
seeking more than $155 million in damages."'
At the time of filing, the Portland Archdiocese faced
approximately $338 million in tort claims and $22 million in
trade creditors claims. 19 By December 2006, the archdiocese had
already paid approximately an additional $15 million to cover its
legal expenses. At their peak, the claims against the archdiocese
reached $500 million, 20 from approximately 175 claimants who

companies, many Catholic religious orders whose own priests and brothers stand
accused, and a prominent archbishop, Cardinal Roger M. Mahony ....).
15 Dan Frosch, Diocese in Iowa Settles with Abuse Victims for $37 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2007, at A24.
16 Alan Cooperman, Archdiocese of Portland,Ore., Declares Bankruptcy, WASH.
POST, July 7, 2004, at Al.
17 Janet I. Tu & Stuart Eskenazi, Archdiocese in PortlandDeclares Bankruptcy,
SEATTLE TIMES, July 7, 2004, at Al.
18 Id.

19 Christina M. Davitt, Whose Steeple Is It? Defining the Limits of the Debtor's
Estate in the Religious Bankruptcy Context, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 531, 532

(2005).
20 Portland Archdiocese Settles Sex-Abuse Claims, OREGONIAN, Dec. 11, 2006,
http://www.oregonlive.com/weblogs/print.ssfP/mtlogs/olive -oregonian-news/archives/
print214297.html.
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alleged sexual misconduct by clergy in the Portland
21
Archdiocese.
The archdiocese contended in its bankruptcy filings that it
possessed approximately $10 million in assets. 22 However, this
accounting excluded parish property, and consisted solely of
diocesan property.
The plaintiff/claimants alleged gross
underrepresentation of the archdiocese's true assets. Real estate
records in Oregon indicated that the value of parish properties
exceeded $400 million. 23 Plaintiffs averred in a complaint filed
on August 11, 2004 that the properties should be included as
assets of the archdiocese, since the Portland archdiocese holds
legal title to them. In response, the archdiocese contended that
under canon law, these properties belonged to the parishes, and
24
the archdiocese merely holds legal title to them in trust.
On December 30, 2005, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Elizabeth
Perris held that the archdiocese, and not the individual parishes,
owned the parish properties. 25 This was a significant defeat for
the archdiocese, which sought to exclude the parish properties
from the archdiocesan assets. Judge Perris, however, left open
the question of whether the sale of individual church properties
could constitute an unfair burden on the practice of religion
under the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993. She
indicated that her decision did not automatically mean that the
parish properties were part of a future bankruptcy settlement.
In June 2006, the archdiocese announced $1.9 million in
budget and staff cuts. 26 These cuts came three years after the
archdiocese initially made $2 million in similar reductions. All of
these reductions were in the direct wake of the bankruptcy
proceedings, and in planning the debt service for paying tort
21 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., No. 04-37154-elpll, slip
op. at 2-3 (Bankr. D. Or. Apr. 13, 2007).
22 PortlandArchdiocese Lists $10 Million in Assets, CATH. WORLD NEWS, Aug. 2,
2004, http://www.cwnews.comnews/viewstory.cfm?recnum=31225.

23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Tort

Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Portland, 335 B.R.
842, 866, 868 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005); William McCall, Judge Rules Portland Church
Property Subject to Bankruptcy Settlement, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 30, 2005,
http://www.signonsandiego.comlnews/nation/20051230-2039-portlandarchdiocese.
html.
26 News Release, Archdiocese of Portland in Or., Archdiocese Announces Budget
and Staff Cuts (June 1, 2006), available at http://www.archdpdx.org/bankruptcy/
news/staff-cuts06.html.
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claims for sexual abuse committed by clergy. 27 The June 2006
staff cuts totaled 14.25 full-time equivalent positions, in addition
to 20 positions cut in 2003.28 Some employees were notified that
their positions were eliminated, some had the number of days
they worked reduced, and others were transferred to other
duties. Outplacement assistance was provided to those losing
29
their jobs.
After two rounds of mediation of the tort claims over a period
of more than two years, a settlement was agreed to by all but
three claimants. 30 Global mediation began in September 2006;
on April 13, 2007, Judge Perris's signed confirmation
memorandum was filed. 3 1 The settlement consisted of a $75
million payment to claimants, which included a fund of
approximately $20 million reserved for future claims. Insurance
covered $52 million. 32 The funds not provided by insurance came
from assets controlled by the archdiocese, but not those of its
parishes and schools. 33 In order to gain approval of the plan, the
archdiocese proved that it had access to $40 million in cash from
Allied Irish Bank, as well as additional unrestricted assets on
which it could draw if necessary, all of which were sufficient to
34
satisfy all of the financial obligations provided for in the plan.
In September 2007, the Archdiocese emerged from
bankruptcy "after it settled 153 claims of sexual abuse for $51
million, with an additional $20 million allotted for possible future
35
victims."
B. Diocese of Tucson
The second Catholic diocese in the United States to file for
Chapter 11 protection was also the first to successfully emerge
from bankruptcy. The Diocese of Tucson, Arizona, which consists

27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 In re

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., No. 04-37154-elpll, slip
op. at 1-2 (Bankr. D. Or. Apr. 13, 2007).
31 Id. at 2-3.
32 Ashbel S. Green, Archdiocese Outlines $75 Million Settlement, OREGONIAN,
Dec. 19, 2006, at Al.
33 Id.
34 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., No. 04-37154-elpll, slip

op. at 17-18 (Bankr. D. Or. Apr. 13, 2007).
35 Frosch, supranote 15.
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of 75 parishes and over 300,000 parishioners throughout nine
counties, filed for bankruptcy on September 20, 2004 as a result
of existing debt and the imminent litigation of clerical sex abuse
36
cases.
Prior to the bankruptcy filing, the diocese had already paid
$17 million in costs related to the abuse scandal.3 7 In 2002, it
had reached settlements with 16 plaintiffs, for approximately $14
million. 38 In order to provide funds sufficient for the settlements,
the diocese had to borrow $4.7 million from its parishes. Prior to
the settlements, the diocese had paid $155,000 to eight other
claimants in the 1990s. 39 At the time of its bankruptcy filing, 22
more lawsuits with 34 plaintiffs had been filed against the
40
Tuscon Diocese.
At the time of filing, the diocese listed $16.6 million in assets
and $20.7 million in liabilities, but that did not include assets of
parishes or its fund-raising arm, the Catholic Foundation for the
Diocese of Tucson. 41 The diocese's parishes each retained their
42
own bankruptcy attorneys.
On July 11, 2005, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge James Marlar
confirmed the diocese's reorganization plan. The diocese agreed
to make available $22.2 million for settlements of claims of
sexual abuse by priests and church workers. 43 In the "tiered"
system plan for distribution, $15.7 million was made available to
more than 50 victims under the settlement agreement. 44 More
than 24 victims received $200,000 to $600,000 each, based on
tiers related to the acts of abuse and injuries suffered. Five
parents of victims received $21,250 to $30,000 each. Of the total
amount, $5 million was set aside to pay minors and future

36 Arthur H. Rotstein, Tucson Diocese Files for Bankruptcy, WASH. POST, Sept.
21, 2004, at A22.
37 Sheryl Kornman, Tucson Diocese Seeks Bankruptcy Protection, USA
TODAY, Sept. 21, 2004, http://www.usatoday.comlnews/nation/2004-09-20-tucsonbankruptx.htm.
38 Id.
39 Id.

40

Id.

41 Stephanie Innes, Diocese: Parishes Separate,ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Dec. 10, 2004,

at B.
Id.
Arthur H. Rotstein, Tucson Diocese Emerges from Chapter 11 Protection,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 21, 2005, http:/www.azcentral.comlarizonarepublicllocal/
articles/092 ldiocese21.html.
42
43

44 Id.
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claimants. 45 The balance was to be divided among already
46
authorized, identified victims.
The $22.2 million was derived from several sources. It
included $14.8 million from insurers and approximately $2
million from the parishes. 47 In addition, the diocese provided
$5.58 million of the settlement amount, all but $300,000 of that
48
coming from an auction of its real estate holdings.
C. Diocese of Spokane
Exactly five months after the Diocese of Portland filed for
bankruptcy, the Diocese of Spokane followed suit on December 6,
2004. 49 The move by the diocese, which consists of 82 parishes,
17 schools, and 93,000 parishioners, came one month before the
start of a sex abuse trial, and one month after five of the diocese's
insurance carriers filed suit, arguing that they should not have to
pay any settlements or judgments in sex abuse cases, in part
because Church officials knew about the abuses but did
nothing. 50
The filing also brought the issue of diocesan
bankruptcy back to the forefront of media attention, as the
Bishop of the Spokane Diocese, William Skylstad, vice president
of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, became President of
51
the Conference.
The move to Chapter 11 protection came after settlement
talks involving 28 plaintiffs allegedly abused by Rev. Patrick
O'Donnell, a former Spokane priest, collapsed. 52 However, the
diocese stated that it knew of 125 people, half of whom had
retained counsel, who said they had been abused by priests in
Eastern Washington. 53 The settlement that was ultimately
approved resulted in payments to approximately 150 claimants. 54
45 Id.
46 Id.

47 Arthur H. Rotstein, Bankruptcy Judge OKs Tucson Diocese Plan to
Reorganize, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 12, 2005, http://www.azcentral.com/arizona

republic/locallarticles/0712tucsondiocesel2.html.
48

Id.

49 Janet I. Tu, Spokane Diocese Files for Bankruptcy, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 7,

2004, at Bi.
50 Id.
51 See Jonathan Martin & Janet I. Tu, Catholic Diocese of Spokane to File for
Bankruptcy, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 11, 2004, at Al.
52

Id.

53 Id.

54 John K. Wiley, Diocese's Bankruptcy Plan to Be Approved, AP ONLINE
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Liabilities arising from the claims were estimated by the
55
diocese in its bankruptcy filing to be approximately $80 million.
By the time the diocese filed for bankruptcy, it had paid only
$272,500 in settlements to five victims between 1999 and 2004.56
In the bankruptcy filing, the diocese listed $11.1 million in
assets. 57 Additionally, "the diocese ha[d] between $15 million
and $19 million in insurance coverage related to the O'Donnell
claims." 5 8
As with the other diocesan bankruptcy filings,
however, the plaintiffs alleged that the exclusion of parish assets
significantly diminished the real value of the diocese's assets,
which they estimated to be closer to $80 million. 59 In August
2005, a U.S. Bankruptcy Court judge held that individual
parishes within the Spokane Diocese, along with some other
Catholic institutions, should be included in the pool of assets
available to victims. 60 This decision, however, was overturned by
U.S. District Court Judge Justin Quackenbush, who held that
"while the Spokane bishop held the deeds to individual parishes,
the parishioners paid for the properties and, therefore, the bishop
61
was only holding the properties in trust."
The diocese put forward an initial $45.7 million settlement
proposal for 75 identified victims of abuse. 62 That proposal was
rejected by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court judge, stating that "it
[was] unfair to specify an amount for those 75 victims but not for
others who [had not yet] filed lawsuits or [otherwise] come
forward." 63 An eventual settlement was reached, however, with
only a minor increase in the offer. On April 24, 2007, the
Bankruptcy Court judge confirmed a reorganization plan to allow
the Diocese of Spokane to emerge from bankruptcy and pay

REGIONAL, Apr. 24, 2007, at 1.
55 See Nicholas K. Geranios, Diocese Cites Abuse Claims in Wash. Bankruptcy
Filing, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 7, 2004, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/
2004/12/07/diocese cites abuse claims in wash bankruptcyjfiling/.
56 Martin & Tu, supra note 51.
57 Geranios, supra note 55.
58 Martin & Tu, supra note 51.
59See Nicholas K. Geranios, Can Spokane Diocese Survive Bankruptcy? Ruling
May Expose More Assets to Abuse, COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, Wash.), July 11, 2005, at
C2.
60 See Janet I. Tu, Judge: Spokane Diocese Can't Sell Parishes,SEATTLE TIMES,

June 16, 2006, at B1.
62

Id.
Id.

63

Id.

61
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victims of sex abuse $48 million. 64
The settlement was
unanimously 65 approved by the parties, with each of the 150
plaintiffs receiving between $15,000 to $1.5 million, depending on
the extent of the abuse they had suffered. 66 The plan also
included the creation of a $1 million fund for future claims. Of
the money distributed, $20 million came from insurance
settlements, $10 million came from the 82 parishes in the
diocese, and the remainder came from the sale of church
property. 67 Shortly after the announcement of the settlement,
the diocese began a Chapter 11 Settlement Campaign, which
asked every Catholic household in the diocese to contribute funds
in order to meet the $10 million obligation of the parishes. 68 The
diocese indicated that participation in the Settlement Campaign
was voluntary, though the parishes were obligated to deposit a
total of $10 million in the bankruptcy plan's trust by December
31, 2007.69
The settlement also required Spokane Bishop
William Skylstad, President of the U.S. Conference of Catholic
Bishops, despite the Chapter 11 filing, to advocate an end to
statutes of limitations for sex abuse crimes and also to write
70
letters of apology to abuse victims and their families.
D. Diocese of Davenport
On October 11, 2006, the Diocese of Davenport became the
fourth United States Catholic diocese to file for Chapter 11
protection. The filing came in response to 25 claims of sexual
abuse against four priests of the diocese; it was also triggered by
prospective future claims of persons who had yet to come
71
forward, according to Bishop William Franklin.

Wiley, supra note 54.
Four wealthy Catholic businessmen, however, deemed the settlement a
"disaster," and called on the Bishop to resign. Bishop Skylstad Asked to Resign, 43
NAT'L CATH. REP., May 4, 2007, at 3.
66 Wiley, supra note 54.
64

65

67

Id.

Robert Hailey & Father Michael Savelesky, From Justice to Healing and
Renewal: The Chapter 11 Settlement Campaign, INLAND REGISTER, May 3, 2007,
http://www.dioceseofspokane.org/CommunicationsIR_2007/irO5O3O7lcampaign.htm.
68

69 Id.

Wiley, supra note 54.
Thomas Geyer, Davenport Diocese Files for Bankruptcy, QUAD-CITY TIMES,
Oct. 11, 2006, http://www.qctimes.com/articles/2006/10/11/news/local/doc452c25cbc
994c696535369.txt.
70

71
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The diocese filed for bankruptcy twenty-two days after a jury
awarded $1.5 million to a Davenport man who claimed he was
sexually abused by a priest in the Davenport Diocese nearly fifty
years ago.7 2 Prior to this award, the diocese had reached
settlements in 2004 and 2005 totaling $10.5 million 7 3 The
diocese estimated in its bankruptcy filings that 25 pending
claims, along with those that may yet be brought by future
litigants, presented up to $100 million in future liabilities to the
74
diocese.
The estimated liabilities from sex abuse-related claims
vastly outweighed the diocese's assets. However, the diocese's
assets were significantly greater than its current liabilities. In
its bankruptcy filing, the diocese reported approximately $7
million in assets, which were offset by approximately $1.6 million
in liabilities, related in large part to the recent $1.5 million
award.7 5 The assets included $4.49 million in investments and
$2.53 million in real estate.7 6 The liabilities did not include any
factors relating to the estimated $100 million in losses the
diocese anticipated from future claims. The diocese also insisted,
relying on federal District Judge Justin Quackenbush's decision
in the Diocese of Spokane, that the assets of its parishes would
not be incorporated into the lawsuit, as the Diocese of Davenport
asserted that it does not own the parishes it serves.
The Diocese's bankruptcy lawyer, Richard Davidson, stated
that the diocese anticipated that its employees would not suffer
77
any financial loss by the time the bankruptcy was resolved.
Davidson also filed a motion to enable the diocese to maintain its
payroll for its employees
throughout the bankruptcy
78
proceedings.
On December 3, 2007, the Diocese emerged from bankruptcy,
as it announced it settled for $37 million the claims of 156

72 Barb Arland-Fye, Diocese of Davenport Files for Bankruptcy, CATH. NEWS
SERV., Oct. 11, 2006, http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/0605777.htm.
73 Id.
74 Voluntary Petition for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, In re Diocese of Davenport,
No. 3:06-BK-02229-LMJ (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Oct. 10, 2006).
75 See id.; Tom Saul, Davenport Diocese Bankruptcy: An Inside Glimpse at the
Books, QUAD-CITY TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006, http://qctimes.com/articles/2006/10/15/
news/local1doc453lc7f74d727956636129.txt.
76 Saul, supra note 75.
77 Id.
78 Id.
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79
persons alleging they had been abused as far back as the 1930s.
Some of the money will be set aside, in the event of future claims
by other persons. The settlement was achieved at 1:00 a.m. on
December 3rd, after four days of intense mediation in Chicago.

E.

Diocese of San Diego

On February 27, 2007, in the most recent instance of
diocesan reorganization, the United States' fifth largest Catholic
Diocese filed for Chapter 11 protection.8 0 The Diocese filed,
literally, "at midnight before the first trial was supposed to
81
start."
The Diocese of San Diego is the largest American diocese to
file for bankruptcy protection as a consequence of lawsuits
alleging sexual abuse.8 2 The Diocese of San Diego covers San
Diego and Imperial counties, consists of ninety-eight churches
and fifty schools, and is home to almost one million
parishioners.8 3 There are forty-five Catholic grade schools, with
a total enrollment of 13,619, and five Catholic high schools, with
a total enrollment of 4,138.84
According to the diocese, there were 166 allegations of sexual
abuse by priests and other ministers in the Diocese of San Diego
pending at the time it filed for Chapter 11 protection.8 5 Of the
166 claims, 126 stem from the 1950s to 1970s.8 6 There were 143
consolidated sex abuse claims that the diocese faced as it filed for
87
Chapter 11 protection.
The estimated liability from those 143 claims is
approximately $200 million dollars. This estimate is derived
79 See Frosch, supra note 15.
80 Mark Sauer, S.D. Catholic Diocese Files for Bankruptcy, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., Feb. 28, 2007, at Al.
81 Brian Baxter, Back on Solid Ground: Floodwaters are Receding for the San
Diego Diocese, AM. LAW., Oct. 2007, at 30, 30.
82 Sauer, supra note 80.
83 Bishop: San Diego Diocese Plans Bankruptcy Filing, USA TODAY, Feb. 28,
2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2007-02-27-sd-church-x.htm?csp=34.
84 DIOCESE OF SAN DIEGO, DIOCESAN CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATION-JUST FOR
THE RECORD... ON CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AND TAX DOLLARS (2007) (on file with

author).
85 DIOCESE

OF

SAN

DIEGO,

DIOCESAN

CHAPTER

11

REORGANIZATION-

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CLAIMS (2007) (on file with author).
86 Id.
87 Bankruptcy Judge Orders Catholic Diocese to Disclose Parish Accounts,
CATH. ONLINE, Apr. 13, 2007, http://www.catholic.org/national/national-story.php?

id=23761.
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from the average settlement figure in California for similar cases.
In 2006, the Archdiocese of Los Angeles settled forty-five of more
than 500 pending cases for $60 million, or an average of about
$1.3 million each.88 In 2004, the Diocese of Orange County
settled ninety abuse claims for $100 million, or $1.11 million
each. 89 From these settlements it is estimated that the San
Diego Diocese faces up to $200 million in potential liability.
The total value of the assets of the diocese is a matter of
significant controversy; there have been claims of fraud and
deceit. The diocese faced a possible contempt charge by a federal
bankruptcy judge and was ordered to undergo an external audit.
Judge Adler threatened to hold Bishop Brom, two parish priests,
and the diocesan counsel in contempt. 90 Initially, the diocese had
submitted a listing of assets that included real estate property
worth more than $95.7 million and personal property of $60.4
million. 91 If the estimated value of all liabilities actually reached
the $200 million figure, the diocese's total assets clearly were
dwarfed by its liabilities.
Plaintiffs' attorneys, however, made several arguments that
the diocese's assets actually far exceeded the figures it presented
to the bankruptcy court. They contended that two high schools
should be considered among the diocese's major assets. 92 The
campus of the University of San Diego High School ("San Diego
High"), was about to be sold, before the bankruptcy proceedings,
for $65 million to a developer who planned to build
condominiums. 93 The property was not listed by the diocese as
an asset in its bankruptcy filings, which claimed that the
property was owned by the Catholic Secondary EducationDiocese of San Diego Corporation ("Secondary Education Corp."),
a separate incorporated entity, formed by the diocese to raise
public money for the construction of the school. 94 The property
was transferred to Secondary Education Corp. in October 2004,

88 See Sauer, supra note 80.
89 Id.
90 Baxter,

supra note 81, at 30.
91 Mark Sauer, Legal Fight over Diocese Assets Zeroes in on Campus, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Mar. 16, 2007, at Al.
92 See id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
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and a bid in 2004 in Los Angeles Superior Court by alleged abuse
95
victims failed to stop the transfer.

The Cathedral Catholic High School ("Cathedral"), in Carmel
Valley, also listed by the diocese as owned by the Secondary
Education Corp., 96 is an $80 million facility of 2,000 students. It
97
is the largest Catholic secondary school in the county.
Plaintiffs argued that its transfer was an attempt to shield the
asset, and that Cathedral, like San Diego High, is actually owned
by the diocese through the diocese's ownership of Secondary
Education Corp.
The San Diego Diocese was also accused of excluding 770
parish accounts from its general accounting in its bankruptcy
filing. 98 Bankruptcy Judge Louise DeCarl Adler, ordered an
external audit of the Diocese of San Diego, and threatened the
diocese with contempt for misrepresenting facts and possibly
violating bankruptcy laws. 99 The diocese responded by arguing

that it had no control over the assets in the parish accounts.
Furthermore, Zalkin & Zimmer, LLP, a leading firm
representing some of the claimants, argued that the diocese
actually had $600 million worth of real property, based solely on
tax assessor's values. 100 It also contended that through the
Catholic Mutual Group, the diocese's insurance protected it from
$250 thousand up to $20 million per person for each abuse claim.
In March of 2007, the diocese proposed a $95 million
settlement schedule for victims that would offer each plaintiff
anywhere from $10,000 to $800,000.101 This range fell short of
comparative settlements in California, which averaged around
$1.11 million to $1.3 million. The dramatic discrepancy between
this parsimonious range and that of the comparatively more
substantial settlements in California, coupled with the numerous
95

See Bid to Freeze Assets of San Diego Diocese Rejected, CATH. NEWS AGENCY,

Oct. 7, 2004, http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/new.php?n=2148.
96 Sauer, supra note 90.
97 Id.
98 See Sexual Abuse: Federal Bankruptcy Judge Orders External Audit of
San Diego Diocese Accounts, CATH. NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 13, 2007, http:/I
www.catholicnewsagency.comlnew.php?n=9095.
99 Id.
100 Press Release, Zalkin & Zimmer, LLP, Response to Pastoral Statement from

Bishop Robert Brom of San Diego Diocese (Feb. 18, 2007), available at
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/metro/20070218-1416-response.html.
101 Allison Hoffman, CaliforniaDiocese Threatened with Contempt, ABC NEWS,
Apr. 11, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=3029537.
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acrimonious allegations of dishonesty and asset shifting, resulted
in a very cold reception and summary rejection of the proposed
settlement by the plaintiffs.
In April of 2007, Judge Adler ordered an audit of the
Archdiocese, whose records she called "the most Byzantine
accounting system I've ever seen."'0 2 Some parishes were moving
around tens of thousands of dollars involving hundreds of bank
accounts.
On June 24, 2007, Bishop Robert Brom announced that the
diocese would continue its effort to exclude parish assets from the
bankruptcy lawsuit, citing canon law that holds that parish
10 3
assets are entirely separate from diocesan assets.
Pursuant to Judge Adler's order of an audit in April, the 175page first audit report by R. Todd Neilson, a forensic CPA, was
issued on July 30, 2007. The report analyzed forty-eight of
ninety-three parishes and twenty-six of forty-three schools. The
audit report:
singled out peculiarities at several parishes, ranging from a
parish presented as impoverished that had $1.2 million in its
bank accounts, to two parishes that apparently moved cash out
of accounts at the time of the bankruptcy filing, putting checks
for tens of thousands of dollars into parish safes, where the
amounts would not. be factored into data included in the
bankruptcy material.104
R. Todd Neilson, the court-appointed expert auditor, said that
some parishes had "engaged in openly questionable activities,"
but he also said that he could not recall an assignment where he
had "more complete and positive cooperation" from a subject. 0 5
In late August of 2007, Judge Adler ordered more than forty
sex abuse cases against the diocese to proceed immediately to
trial; trials for five cases had been suspended since February,
when the diocese filed for bankruptcy on the evening before the
trials were scheduled to commence on the morning of February
28th. 10 6 Judge Adler opined earlier in August that the diocese
was concealing assets:
102

Audit of Diocese Finds "Byzantine Accounting," AMERICA, Aug. 13-20, 2007,

at 8.
103 DIOCESE

OF

SAN DIEGO,

DIOCESAN

CHAPTER

11

REORGANIZATION-A

PASTORAL UPDATE FROM BISHOP ROBERT (2007) (on file with author).
104

105
106

Audit of Diocese Finds "ByzantineAccounting," supra note 102.
Brian Baxter, supra note 81, at 30.
California:Sex-Abuse Trials to Go On, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2007, at All.
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Some parishes are actively and deliberately hiding assets ... or

inappropriately designating donations as restricted to
circumvent or evade the direction of the diocese and/or the
court.... Bank accounts have not been fully disclosed on the
diocese's bankruptcy schedules ... The diocese failed to disclose

material facts to the court with respect to its cash-management
system.... [The] diocese has persisted in reporting its assets at
value as required
assessed valuation, rather than fair-market
10 7
by all debtors in bankruptcy proceedings.
Thus, ignominiously, the largest Archdiocese to file thus far for
bankruptcy has been labeled as fundamentally dishonest by the
federal bankruptcy court.
Despite the numerous accusations of fraud and dishonesty,
and the mounting frustrations of the bankruptcy court, the
diocese reached a settlement with 144 of the claimants on
September 7, 2007, and the settlement will be presented to Judge
Adler for approval' 0 8 At $198.1 million, it is the second largest
settlement made by a Catholic diocese in connection with the
sexual abuse scandal after the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, which
had its $660 million settlement approved two months earlier. 10 9
Under the agreement, the diocese will pay approximately $107
million, the Diocese of San Bernardino will contribute
approximately $15 million, and insurance will pay approximately
$76 million. 110
In order to fund its contribution to the settlement
agreement, the diocese will likely look toward its significant
property holdings throughout San Diego County. While the
diocese has not indicated exactly how it will fund its portion of
the settlement, the chancellor of the diocese, Rodrigo Valdivia,
stated that the diocese had no plans to close any parishes or
schools as a consequence of the settlement agreement."1 As of
12
early December 2007, the diocese faces a $25 million shortfall.

107 Order to Show Cause Why Case Should Not Be Dismissed, In re Roman
Catholic Bishop of San Diego, No. 07-00939-All (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2007).
108 See Randal C. Archibold, San Diego Diocese Settles Lawsuit for $200 Million,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2007, at A8.

109 See id.

110 See id.
111 See id.
112

Frosch, supra note 15.
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II.

A SYNOPSIS OF MAJOR LEGAL ISSUES

Of all of the issues presented by the diocesan
reorganizations, perhaps the most crucial are the methods used
by the Church and by the bankruptcy courts to account for a
diocese's assets. 113 Much turns on whether a bankruptcy court
can include, or must exclude, the assets of a diocese's individual
parishes when accounting for the total assets of the diocese. The
majority of the assets of the five dioceses that filed for
bankruptcy were contained in the individual parishes; the bulk of
a diocese's assets is usually in the real estate of the parishes.
Accordingly, the total amount a diocese is forced to pay out to
claimants under a bankruptcy settlement could be vastly
increased if the court holds that the value of all of the parishes'
properties should be included in the assets of the diocese, and if,
as appears likely in San Diego, the court determines that the
parishes were complicit with the diocese in subterfuge.
Whether parishes are considered within the asset pool of the
diocese also implicates core First Amendment questions. The
dioceses that filed for bankruptcy claimed that canon law strictly
separates the assets of the diocese from the assets of the
individual parishes. According to canon law, the diocese merely
holds the properties in trust. Consequently, they should not be
accounted as assets in any bankruptcy reorganization plan. To
do so would trigger unconstitutional excessive entanglement of
the federal bankruptcy court in the internal theology of the
Church. Plaintiffs/creditors counter this defense by arguing that
since the bishop of a diocese holds title to all of the properties,
the bankruptcy court should not unilaterally exclude any of the
assets of a diocese. And, since the diocese voluntarily invoked
the protections of the bankruptcy law, it cannot concurrently
invoke canon law to avoid selective application of the federal
bankruptcy law by the federal bankruptcy court.
The day-to-day management of the estate-of the dioceseonce a diocese enters bankruptcy, has many important
constitutional dimensions. The bishop is potentially wholly
conflicted when he functions as a debtor in possession. Normally,
the duties of a debtor in possession go toward the estate's
113 The landmark article, written decades before the sex crimes came to light in
2002, is perhaps, Charles M. Whelan, S.J., Current Attitudes of the Courts Toward
Church Propertiesand Liabilities, 26 CATH. LAW. 219 (1981).
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creditors. However, in a diocesan reorganization, the debtor in
possession-the bishop-has an inviolable allegiance to the
Church. A settlement requiring the Bishop to proselytize for
removal of the statute of limitation for bringing claims of sexual
abuse supplants the pastoral leadership of the Bishop with that
of the federal courts. If the creditors are not satisfied with a
bishop as a debtor in possession, this conflict can quickly
metastasize as to whether the court can appoint a Chapter 11
trustee, rather than the bishop of the diocese, for a religious
entity debtor, directly triggering the most essential First
Amendment concerns.
Chaos reigns, and, given the deterioration in San Diego,
threatens to exponentially accelerate. Each of the bankruptcy
judges to pronounce on these issues has charted their own course
in the five diocesan reorganizations thus far. There are obviously
contradictions among the various opinions and orders. For
example, in the Diocese of Spokane, the Bankruptcy Court judge
held that individual parishes within the Spokane Diocese, along
with some other Catholic institutions, should be included in the
pool of assets available to satisfy victims' claims. 114 That
decision, however, was overturned by District Judge Justin
Quackenbush. 115 Similarly, in the Archdiocese of Portland,
Bankruptcy Judge Elizabeth Perris held that the archdiocese,
11 6
and not the individual parishes, owned the parish properties.
Perris left open, however, the question of whether this could pose
an unconstitutional burden on the practice of religion under the
Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993. She then
indicated that her holding did not automatically mean that the
parish properties could be included as part of any future
1 17
bankruptcy settlement.
These are all critically important issues and questions, and
are sure to command attention over the course of the next several
decades, as other dioceses are likely to enter into the bankruptcy
regime.

114

In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. 304, 330-31 (Bankr. E.D. Wash.

2005).
115 Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81, 95
(Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2006).

116 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., 335 B.R. 842, 867-68
(Bankr. D. Or. 2006).
117

Id. at 866.
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III. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT RAMIFICATIONS OF THE DIOCESAN

BANKRUPTCY FILINGS
A.

Some EmpiricalData

Surprisingly, only three of the five dioceses to seek the
protection of bankruptcy law have experienced a decline in the
number of lay teachers, according to the Official Catholic
Directory 118 for 2002 and 2006.119
The most striking decline in lay teachers among the five
dioceses occurred in Davenport, Iowa. As of January 1, 2002, the
diocese had 730 lay teachers. By January 1, 2006, that number
was down to 298 lay teachers. Yet, only one of the seven high
schools was closed. Meanwhile, the parish elementary schools
actually increased in number from eighteen to twenty during
those four years. Only one parish closed between 2002 and 2004
in Davenport, leaving eighty-four parishes remaining in 2006.
Since 2002, San Diego lost more than one-third of its lay
teachers, falling from 1,591 to only 1,051 in 2006, despite opening
the second of two elementary schools in the diocese. The number
of diocesan and parish high schools remained the same (three), as
did the number of private high schools (two). There were fortythree diocesan and parish schools throughout the four year
period. The years 2002 and 2006 both began with ninety-eight
parishes and sixteen missions in the diocese. The only marked
loss in this portrait of consistency is the dramatic decline in lay
teachers.
Portland lost more than ten percent of its lay teachers
between 2002 and 2006, falling from 1,383 to 1,203. The number
of diocesan and parish high schools has remained at three, and
the number of private high schools has remained at seven, since
2002. Only one of the diocesan and parish elementary schools
has closed since 2002, leaving forty. The two private elementary
schools in the diocese in 2002 have not, as of 2006, been affected.
There was one less parish in Portland at the start of 2006 (124)
compared to four years prior (125).
Diocesan missions

118 See THE OFFICIAL CATHOLIC DIRECTORY (2002); THE OFFICIAL CATHOLIC

DIRECTORY (2006). The Official Catholic Directory is published annually. Unless
otherwise noted, the following statistics are drawn from these two publications.
119 See THE OFFICIAL CATHOLIC DIRECTORY 341, 1021, 1207, 1289, 1364 (2002);
THE OFFICIAL CATHOLIC DIRECTORY 347, 1032, 1218, 1301, 1377 (2006).
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experienced minimal declines, from twenty-six in 2002 to twenty-

four in 2006.
The bankrupt diocese showing expansion in the number of
lay teachers since 2002 is Tucson, Arizona. There were 363 lay
teachers in 2002, and 472 in 2006. The four diocesan and parish
high schools in 2002 became private institutions, leaving only
private high schools by 2006. As a result of this shift, there were
six private high schools in 2006, increasing from two in 2002.
The number of both kinds of elementary schools increased during
the four-year period that started in 2002. There were twenty
diocesan and parish elementary schools in 2002, and twenty-two
of them in 2006. The number of private elementary schools
increased from two to three during that period. The diocese of
Tucson's growth during this period was not only in education, but
in the number of parishes as well, which increased from seventyone to seventy-four, and in the number of missions, which
expanded from thirty to forty, a thirty percent increase during
those four years.

The fifth American diocese in bankruptcy, and the second in
that group of five to have increased the number of its lay
teachers between 2002 and 2006, is Spokane, Washington, with
291 lay teachers in 2002, and 301 in 2006. In 2006, there was
still only one diocesan and parish high school, just as in 2002, but
there were two private high schools, an increase of one from
2002. There are still no private elementary schools, but there
was one less diocesan and parish elementary school in 2006,

down to fifteen from the sixteen that existed in 2002. There were
also four more parishes in 2006, eighty-two, compared to 2002,
but one less diocesan mission (two in 2006).
The total number of lay teachers in all American Catholic
dioceses was 164,704 in 2002, declining to 163,672 in 2006.
According to the National Catholic Education Association,
however, in its Annual StatisticalReport on Schools, Enrollment
and Staffing, there were 152,071 lay teachers in elementary and
secondary schools for the 2006-2007 school year. 120 During those
four years, the number of diocesan and parish high schools
declined from 786 to 782, but private high schools increased from
557 to 572. A similar trend occurred among grammar schools.
120 NAT'L CATHOLIC EDUC. ASS'N, UNITED STATES CATHOLIC ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY SCHOOLS 2006-2007: ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT ON SCHOOLS,
ENROLLMENT AND STAFFING, http://www.ncea.org/news/AnnualDataReport.asp.
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Diocesan and parish elementary schools plummeted from 6,623
to 6,148, while private schools increased from 326 to 363. The
total number of parishes also declined, from 19,496 to 18,992, as
did the number of missions, 3,036 to 2,889.
The complete impact of the sex abuse litigation, and the
bankruptcy proceedings, is not fully borne out in these data. Nor
do these statistics on the five dioceses account for those changes
directly attributable to the bankruptcy of those dioceses.
B.

Impacts on Individual Workers

The greatest toll is that taken on the body and the soul of the
victim of the sexual abuse.
Some of these victims were
employees of the Church when they were abused. 121 Some,
abused as volunteers, such as altar boys, or as students or
seminarians, later went on to become priests. 122 Auxiliary
Bishop Thomas Gumbleton of the Archdiocese of Detroit
eloquently spoke about how he was himself abused as a minor by
124
a priest. 123 Some of the abused themselves became abusers.
Many are scarred for life, making viable employment and
productive career prospects quite difficult and problematic, if not
125
entirely elusive.
The abusers, in almost all instances, were themselves the
employees and agents of the Church. Despite the infamous
statement of accomplished canon lawyer Edward Cardinal Egan,
when he was the Bishop of the Diocese of Bridgeport,
Connecticut, that priests were independent contractors, and not
the employees of the Diocese,1 26 there is no doubt that priests are,

121 See Paul A. Long, Diocese of Covington Settles Sex Lawsuit, CINCINNATI
POST, June 17, 2003, at A9 (discussing a lawsuit filed by two employees of the
Diocese of Covington over sexual assaults and harassment).
122 See Richard Lezin Jones, Priest Who Saw Abuse from Other Side Becomes
Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2002, § 1 (Late Edition), at 43.
123 Jodi Wilgoren, Bishop Backs Bill Allowing Old Abuse Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 2006, at A20.
124 Gill Donovan, Priest Says He Also Was a Victim of Clerical Abuse,
NAT'L CATH. REP., Jan. 17, 2003, http://www.natcath.comINCROnline/archives/
011703/011703m.htm.
125 Deliver Us from Evil is an Academy Award-nominated documentary directed
by Amy Berg, which focuses on Oliver O'Grady, a Catholic priest in northern
California who was convicted of sexually abusing children, and is believed to have
possibly abused hundreds of children.
126 Laurie Goodstein, Scandal in the Church: The Cardinals;On a Mission to
Restore Credibility, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2002, § 1 (Late Edition), at 30.
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in fact, employees, and not independent contractors. Negligence,
rather than vicarious liability or respondeat superior, is the
principal cause of action, since the priest-abusers are clearly
engaged in malevolent activity completely outside the scope of
their employment. Thus, in most instances, the Church as
employer is responsible for the torts of negligently training,
hiring, ordaining, retaining, supervising, and, in some instances
transferring, priest-abusers. 127 The mortal sins of the abusers
distort all that they do, warping the product of all of their
perhaps otherwise legitimate labors.
Those accused of sexual abuse, and especially those falsely
accused, are entitled to due process protections according to both
canon law and secular law. 128 Understandably, they must be
removed from active employment upon credible accusations,
while concurrently entitled to due process-indeed, one of the
most pernicious dimensions of the sex crimes are the widespread
perception, and perhaps the reality in at least some situations,
that priests accused of committing abuse were transferred by
bishops and allowed to remained active as priests-and to have
opportunities to continue to abuse new victims.
Suspension from active ministry upon credible allegation,
while the charges are further investigated and prosecuted,
should usually accord with sufficient due process. This is
generally analogous to the status of a labor union-represented
employee grievant in a classic unpaid suspension/discipline/
discharge case.
The general operational norm is that the
employee is removed from pay status, disciplined by an unpaid
suspension, or terminated, by the employer, while the employer
subsequently bears the burden of proving the charges before a
neutral third-party arbitrator, pursuant to the grievance and
arbitration mechanisms of the parties' collective bargaining
agreement.
The due process dynamic, however, becomes especially
problematic when the Bishops honor it in form, but vitiate
it in substance.
When persons are falsely accused, they
127 See

DAVID L. GREGORY, The Road from Negligence to Negligence in

Employment, in NEGLIGENCE IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 1, 8-15 (Alfred G. Feilu &

Weyman T. Johnson eds., 2002); see also Bainbridge & Cole, supra note 5, at 68.
128 1 have explored the due process dimensions of applied Catholic social
teaching in the sexual abuse context, in David L. Gregory, Reflections on Current
Labor Applications of Catholic Social Teaching, 1 J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 647, 65864 (2004).
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understandably seek to clear their good names as soon as
possible. If the process to do so becomes completely opaque and
seemingly endless, while the accused is in an internal exile
approaching professional solitary confinement, the innocent who
are falsely accused are deeply, perhaps irreparably, wounded. A
suicide by an accused priest was reported in August 2007.129
It is absolutely imperative that the Church be both efficient
and thorough, and that the accused be treated with fundamental
fairness and timely due process.
All volunteers, ranging from the choir to the youth ministry
to Eucharistic ministers and lectors and altar servers,
seminarians, and all employees must be subject to thorough
background checks-arguably marginally somewhat intrusive,
but certainly prudent, and, in the wake of the sexual abuse
tsunami, de facto, if not de jure, mandatory.
C.

Impact on Faculty in Catholic Schools

In addition to logical inferences of omission-with finite
resources committed to payment of claims to settle sex abuse
litigation-there are apostolates that must necessarily be
reduced, suspended, terminated, and potential future apostolates
put indefinitely on hold or cancelled outright. The Catholic
schools present perhaps the center stage for assessing the likely
ramifications for labor. For, as Archbishop Brom of San Diego
unequivocally stated in his Sunday, April 22, 2007, Pastoral
Update on Diocesan Reorganization to the Pastors and People of
the Diocese of San Diego:
129 Paul Likoudis, Friends of Late Priest Chronicle Last Months, WANDERER,
Aug. 16, 2007, at 2. Likoudis reported:
A priest in our diocese [Altoona-Johnstown, Pennsylvania], who is now 64
years old, was accused of sexual impropriety with a minor male 37 years
ago. The priest, who has always obeyed all rules and has always done what
was asked of him, was asked to leave his parish in early March [2007]
while the allegations against him was being investigated. He left the
parish, as requested. There was virtually no communications with him
from the diocese until about a month ago when the acting vicar general,
without any notice before hand, appeared at his door and demanded that
he resign as pastor of his parish. He did so, without consulting anyone and
without the benefit of any advice from a canon lawyer.
Id.
The Bishop's letter was read publicly at Sunday Masses at the five parishes
where the priest had served over the course of 38 years, informing the audience that
the priest had been accused of impropriety and urging anyone with evidence to
contact diocesan authorities. Shortly thereafter, the priest committed suicide.
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Catholic education is at the heart of our mission... we are
making every effort to see that money designated for the
construction and operation of Catholic schools will not be used
for any other purpose, and will continue to make Catholic

education

1 30

available

to

families

with

limited

financial

resources.

Indeed, the Archdiocese of Los Angeles unequivocally stated
that no schools or churches would be closed as a result of its $774
million settlement of almost 600 claims in July 2007, also
situating Catholic education at the heart of the mission.
Although the Catholic labor encyclicals and the Bishops'
Pastoral Letters eloquently proclaim the rights of workers to
unionize,1 31 most teachers in Catholic schools are not unionized.
This notorious paradox flows from NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago,1 32 wherein the United States Supreme Court held that
the First Amendment of the Constitution prohibited the
excessive entanglement of secular government and of secular

law, such as the National Labor Relations Act and the National
Labor Relations Board, in the internal governance and theology
of the Church. 133 Consequently, as a matter of federal law,
teachers in Catholic primary and secondary schools do not have
the right to form labor unions and to bargain collectively with
their employer. Neither do faculty at Catholic colleges have any
such rights. The United States Supreme Court held in NLRB v.
Yeshiva University 34 that faculty are supervisors and managers,
not employees, and thus are not within the protections of the
13 5
National Labor Relations Act.

130 ARCHBISHOP

ROBERT BROM,

PASTORAL

LETTER

UPDATE ON DIOCESAN

REORGANIZATION (Archdiocese of San Diego, Apr. 23, 2007) (on file with author).
131

I have written extensively on Catholic social teaching regarding labor and

employment. See generally David L. Gregory, Catholic Labor Theory and the
Transformation of Work, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 119 (1988); David L. Gregory,
Catholic Social Teaching on Work, 49 LAB. L.J. 912 (1998); David L. Gregory, The
Right to Unionize as a FundamentalHuman and Civil Right, 9 MIss. C. L. REV. 135

(1988).
132 440 U.S. 490 (1979). I have criticized this decision. See David L. Gregory &
Charles J. Russo, The First Amendment and the Labor Relations of ReligiouslyAffiliated Employers, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 449, 456-59 (1999).
133 CatholicBishop of Chicago, 440 U.S at 507.
134 444 U.S. 672 (1980). I have criticized this decision. See David L. Gregory &
Charles J. Russo, Overcoming NLRB v. Yeshiva University by the Implementation of
Catholic Labor Theory, 41 LAB. L.J. 55 (1990).
135 Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 686-90.
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After a diocese files for bankruptcy, however, the legal
landscape necessarily changes, including, potentially, its labormanagement relations. 1 6 In those particular situations where a
diocese may not have invoked its secular prerogatives under the
Chicago Bishop decision, and continues to recognize and
negotiate with its faculty in the collective union model, any such
diocese considering bankruptcy filing may deem it preemptively
prudent, although contrary to Catholic teaching on the rights of
workers, to invoke the Chicago Bishop decision and to withdraw
recognition of the faculty union. Otherwise, for such a diocese in
bankruptcy, its collective bargaining will fall under Section 1113
of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, mandating extensive good faith
bargaining with the union about employer proposals for
modifications in wages and benefits "necessary to permit the
reorganization of the debtor [the employer]" 137 before filing an
application with the bankruptcy court for the court's permission
to abrogate the labor contract. The federal bankruptcy court will
approve such an application to reject the collective bargaining
agreement only after finding that the debtor employer
meticulously complied with all of the precise statutory
requirements that the union rejected the employer's proposal to
modify the contract "without good cause," and that the balance of
the equities "clearly favors" rejection of the labor contract.
How might such scenarios play out? Today, a diocese
generally has the prerogative to close schools and churches,
unilaterally and independent of any governmental oversight or
approval.
While this can understandably trigger heartwrenching emotions among the affected parishioners, there is
little recourse that can be had by the parishioners or the parish
church per se.
If a parish or diocesan school is closed and teachers are laid
off, the protections of a labor union and a collective bargaining
agreement may constrain, or at least contour, such managerial
136 I have written extensively about the intersection of labor and bankruptcy
law. See generally David L. Gregory, Labor Contract Rejection in Bankruptcy: The
Supreme Court's Attack on Labor in NLRB v. Bildisco, 25 B.C. L. REV. 539 (1984);
David L. Gregory, Legal Developments Since NLRB v. Bildisco: PartialResolution of
Problems Surrounding Labor Contract Rejection in Bankruptcy, 62 DENV. U. L. REV.
615 (1985); David L. Gregory, The Congressional Response to NLRB v. Bildisco and
the Constitutional Subtleties of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 62 U. DET. MERCY L.

REV. 245 (1985).
137 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2000).
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actions via, say, negotiation of transfer rights of senior teachers
to other schools in the diocese, and adequate severance. While
the decision to close a school or a parish church is a fundamental
decision at the heart of entrepreneurial control, and thus not a
subject of bargaining with the labor union, the effects of the
closing are mandatory subjects of bargaining-such as transfer
or bumping to another school, and severance pay. 138 Without a
union and a labor contract, however, a senior teacher with forty
years of exemplary service may be summarily laid off when the
local parish school is closed, while newly-hired, junior teachers
fresh out of college teach at a wealthy parish school a few miles
away; the laid off senior teacher, absent a contract, generally has
no legal basis or right to "bump" a junior teacher at the
wealthy parish school a few miles away. This, obviously, is
fundamentally unfair.
The Archdiocese of Los Angeles unequivocally and publicly
pledged that it would not close any schools or parishes, "nor will
their essential ministries be affected" by the sale of the chancery
and fifty other properties in order to pay the $774 million in
Not all of the five dioceses that filed for
settlement. 139
bankruptcy, however, have been able to make such an
unequivocal and public commitment-making the above
hypothetical scenario more than a moot hypothetical, perhaps.
CONCLUSION

With the most recent settlements in the fall of 2007 by the
San Diego and Davenport, Iowa Dioceses, all five of the dioceses
that filed for bankruptcy have reemerged. Whether they have
reemerged "successfully"-whatever "success" may mean in these
Whether the
difficult circumstances-remains to be seen.
tactical or strategic resort by the dioceses to the federal
bankruptcy regime was worth the effort will be debated for years.
In all probability, other dioceses are virtually certain to enter the
federal bankruptcy arena as a result of the enormous money
damage liability flowing from clergy sex crimes.
The myriad ramifications of the phenomenon of the Catholic
diocese invoking bankruptcy law, and the incredible dynamic of

138

First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).

139Dennis Coday, L.A. Archdiocese Announces Settlement, NAT'L CATH. REP.,
Aug. 3, 2007, at 8.
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bishops and dioceses subjecting themselves to the federal
bankruptcy judges, merit the most searching analysis. The
consequences are profound for everyone.
The list of those negatively impacted by the clergy sexual
abuse scandal, and the subsequent .bankruptcy filings of the five
dioceses, is unfortunately impressively long. The consequences
this situation will have on labor in particular may prove to be
extensive, and may last well beyond December 2007, with the
emergence of the fifth and last diocese, Davenport, Iowa, from
bankruptcy.
One potential consequence may be a catalyst spurring
employees of the Catholic dioceses, and in particular Catholic
school teachers, to more aggressively pursue unionization to
better secure their otherwise inherently unstable positions. A
focal point of where the diocesan bankruptcies will have the most
noticeable impact on labor will be in the Catholic schools.
Dioceses such as San Diego have suffered a significant decrease
in faculty positions as a consequence of the sexual abuse scandal;
the trend began well prior to the recent announcement of the
$198 million settlement agreement. In its effort to pay its share
of the agreement, the San Diego Diocese will have to make
further unpleasant decisions, and despite its claim that it has no
"current plans" to close any parishes or schools, it is not
unforeseeable that in the future more faculty positions may be
eliminated to save money, and more schools may be sold. The
adverse consequences upon employees appear inexorable.
Consider the inevitability of the consequences of the 2006-2007
settlements of claims upon the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, as
summarized by the editors of Commonweal:
[T]hree-quarters of a billion dollars is a huge amount of money,
even for a diocese as large and financially secure as Los Angeles
is. The archdiocese will pay $250 million in cash, insurance will
cover $227 million, and religious orders will be responsible for
the rest. To put this in context, in 2006 the assets of the
archdiocese totaled $494 million, its liabilities were $415
million, meaning its net assets were $79 million. Considering
that the archdiocese spent a total of $35 million on its many
programs in '06 (social services, evangelization, education, etc.),
no one should harbor any illusions about the damage the
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settlement
will do to the church's ability to carry out its
1 40
mission.
And, inexorably and predictably, innocent priests have been
"asked" to contribute one month's salary ($1,485-$1,535), and
retired priests asked to contribute whatever they are able, to
help pay the almost $200 million in recent settlements in San
Diego: "'We cannot ask of others what we are unwilling to do
ourselves,' San Diego Bishop Robert Brom said in a memo to
diocesan priests. Parishioners will be asked for 'a generous
'14 1
contribution' as well.
Where does this leave the teachers who find their positions
about to be eliminated, and perhaps equally important, where
does this leave those teachers who are witness to their colleagues
losing their jobs as a result of the diocesan scandals and
bankruptcy filings?
Clearly, the faculty members who are
witnessing the national decrease in Catholic school teachers are
not likely to stand idly by. Perhaps there will be more aggressive
unionization.
This potential initiative faces the obvious hurtle, namely the
Chicago Bishop decision that allows a diocese to not recognize a
teachers' union in a Catholic school. As the case was decided
nearly three decades ago, however, litigation that may flow today
from the bankruptcy filings will face courts decidedly more
skeptical of the institutional employer Church's defenses. While
the sexual abuse problem existed in the Catholic Church twentyeight years ago, it was not widely known, save among insiders.
Today, that problem has brought the Church to the forefront of
the media, and quite squarely into the federal bankruptcy court.
It may be much more difficult for a diocese to contend that it
stands behind the inviolable curtain of canon law and is
insulated from government regulation by the First Amendment,
when, at the same time, it freely enters bankruptcy protection.
The Church has become so interwoven in the legal system over
the past half-decade, as evidenced through the five diocesan
bankruptcies, that some courts may correctly perceive that that
Church has acquiesced in allowing itself to be governed by more
than just canon law. As it has allowed its liabilities to be
regulated and determined by federal bankruptcy law, it is
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$660 Million, COMMONWEAL, Aug. 17, 2007, at 5.
Priests Asked to Help Pay, NAT'L CATH. REP., Oct. 19, 2007, at 3.
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certainly plausible that the courts may, in the near future,
determine that there is no compelling First Amendment
prohibition of the labor law rights of Catholic school teachers.
Future litigation regarding the potential unionization of
Catholic school teachers may find a more favorable reception in
federal court than did the teachers in Chicago Bishop. Simply
consider the wildly heterogeneous decisions rendered by
bankruptcy judges involved in the diocesan reorganizations.
Some judges have held that parish property could be included in
a reorganization settlement, while other judges have held that
parish properties must be excluded from a settlement plan due to
the First Amendment. Such volatility among the bankruptcy
court decisions auger a possible repudiation of Chicago Bishop.
Where does this leave Catholic school teachers? On the
immediate horizon, as the settlements continue, and perhaps
more dioceses pursue filing for bankruptcy protection,
unionization will have the clear effect of placing teachers in a far
better position when facing a diocese that is quick to pull the
layoff trigger. As the dioceses eventually return to a state of
normalcy, the gains labor may achieve during this crisis may
remain. The culture of Catholic school teachers will shift, for
better or for worse, and the Church may more fully recognize the
merits of unionization by one of the Church's most faithful and
important constituencies.
As Los Angeles and San Diego begin to deal with the massive
settlements they have agreed to, the employees of the Catholic
Church nationwide will observe how the two dioceses treat their
employees, and in particular, their teachers. While a new and
aggressive push toward unionization faces its fair share of legal
obstacles such as Chicago Bishop, recent decisions by the
bankruptcy courts have demonstrated that such impediments
may not be as strong as they originally were, and the nation, and
the Church in the United States, may be eventually be
introduced to a new, and unionized, Catholic school teacher labor
force.

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES

